Asset price formation and behavioral biases by Feldman, T & Lepori, G
Asset Price Formation and Behavioral Biases1
Todd Feldman and Gabriele Lepori
Finance Department, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, 94132, USA.
tfeldman@sfsu.edu
Keele Management School, Keele University, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, United Kingdom.
g.lepori@keele.ac.uk
Abstract
We examine the debate on whether psychology affects asset prices using
agent-based modelling. We set up three simulation regimes where the first
regime contains fundamental investors who invest based on the mean variance
framework. The second regime includes purely irrational investors who invest
based on behavioral biases. The third regime combines the two types of in-
vestors. We test whether the return properties from regime three converge to
that of regime one or two. Results suggest that the type of irrationality affects
return properties in different ways. Irrational investors who are introspective
in their irrationality, only examining their performance and deficiencies, do
not have much of a systematic effect on stock returns when combined with
rational investors. However, irrational investors that aggregate information
in an irrational manner have a systematic effect when combined with rational
investors.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to test whether psychology plays a role in
the formation of stock prices by exploiting new techniques developed from
the agent-based finance literature. More specifically, we ask if different types
of irrationality affect market price dynamics in different ways. To do so we
create a virtual stock market where rational and different types of irrational
agents (investors) coexist. All investors use a variant of the mean-variance
framework where irrational investors price risk based on behavioral biases.
The net interaction between all investors influences the stock price dynamics.
The motivation for the paper is based on the ongoing debate between
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and behavioral theorists. EMH theorists
argue that a market which is competitive and reasonably liquid aggregates
the information potentially known by millions of diverse investors. This
aggregation process occurs such that prices reflect all available information no
matter whether irrational investors exist. Irrational investors do not impact
the aggregation process for various reasons but two reasons stand out. First,
poor trading strategies leave the irrational investor with no wealth leaving
only rational investors. Second, the trading of irrational investors may be
self-canceling, which would leave the determination of prices in the hands of
the rational investors.
Behavioralists argue that the existence of stock market anomalies, such as
excessive volatility and stock market bubbles and crashes, provide evidence
against rationality. They argue that irrational investors do matter because
these anomalies would never occur otherwise. Several empirical papers have
provided evidence that investors do exhibit behavioral biases, (See Barber
and Odean (2000)). However, behavioralists have still not provided sufficient
evidence that these behavioral biases found in the literature actually impact
asset prices.
We provide insight into this debate by simulating a virtual framework us-
ing three distinct regimes. The first regime includes purely rational investors
and the second regime includes purely irrational investors. We explore the
return properties of both simulated regimes to understand how differently
they impact asset prices. Thereafter, we create a third regime where both
rational and irrational investors are combined into one market. Irrational
investors should become insolvent and become bankrupt if the EMH group
is correct. Rational investors would then dominate the market and the re-
turn proprieties would reflect regime one’s properties overtime. Irrational
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investors should not become insolvent or their trades self-canceling if the
behavioralists are correct.
We create the simulated regimes using the pricing process developed by
Friedman & Abraham (2009) and modeling of investors with various biases
by Feldman (2011). The price process begins when each investor makes an
allocation decision between a risky asset such as a S&P 500 portfolio and
a safe asset such as cash. All investors make this decision by examining
the trade-off between risk and return. The primary difference between a
rational and irrational investor is how risk is priced. Each period all investors
choose an allocation between a stock portfolio and cash. At that point,
the computer program averages each investor’s allocation choice across all
investors weighting by their portfolio size. Therefore, investors with greater
wealth have a greater impact on the mean allocation. As the mean allocation
changes, the stock price changes. For example, more demand for the stock
portfolio across investors increases the mean allocation resulting in the stock
price increasing. As the stock price changes, the new information feeds back
into every investor’s objective function, resulting in a new allocation choice.
The mean allocation is updated thereby changing prices again. This feedback
process between allocation choice and price continues until the simulation
ends.
This paper extends Friedman & Abraham as well as Feldman’s work by
combining rational and different types of irrational investors in one market
where investors can become insolvent and get kicked out the market. The
primary extension is defining irrational investors into two subgroups, intro-
spective and aggregating. The first type is irrationally introspective in that
the source of the irrationality can be tracked back to their own performance.
They exhibit well known biases such as overconfidence, loss aversion, and
regret. For example, an irrationally introspective investor behavior may be
greatly affected if he or she experiences losses. However, they are not af-
fected if they witness others losing money. The second type is irrationally
aggregating in that they are affected by the decisions and outcomes of other
investors. For example, an irrationally aggregating investor may be affected
if they witness other investors losing money even if they are not. That expe-
rience will create an incentive to sell their risky asset to prevent them from
losing money as well.
A secondary extension includes modeling a new irrational investor, over-
confident investors. Overconfidence is one of the most written about biases
in the behavioral finance literature. Hirshleifer & Luo (2001) find that over-
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confident investors may outperform rational investors. We model an over-
confident investor via the investor’s alpha where the investor believes they
can routinely outperform the broad stock market. Another secondary exten-
sion includes the introduction of insolvency. Insolvency leaves the possibility
for one group to dominate the market. In past agent-based papers, such
as Friedman & Abraham (2009) and Brock & Hommes (1998), each investor
could not go bankrupt so that no one investor could dominate the market. By
allowing bankruptcy we can thereby test whether rational investors dominate
in the end as EMH would tell us.
Results suggest EMH theory holds depending on the type of irrationality
that dominates in the marketplace. The irrationally aggregating investors are
not driven out of the market and still impact asset prices in the long-run when
combined with rational investors. A market where irrationally aggregating
and rational investors invest together possesses negative skewness, positive
excess kurtosis, and greater volatility than the rational regime. On the other
hand, asset prices are not significantly affected when irrationally introspec-
tive investors are combined with rational investors. Over the long-run the
return properties exhibit low volatility, a slightly skewed normal distribu-
tion, and thin tails, just as in the rational regime case. Even so, irrationally
introspective together with rational investors tend to keep the stock price
lower than its fundamental value, unlike in the purely rational regime where
the stock price trades around fundamental value. The intuition is that the
poor performance and noise created the introspective investors drives prices
down. This distinction between what we call irrationally aggregating and
irrationally introspective investors is important to understanding how irra-
tional behavior drives asset prices. For example, how does the view that
housing prices always increase prevail in the marketplace? Based on our
result, this outcome occurs when people view the losses and gains of other
people and slowly become convinced that housing prices will never fall. They
get caught into a way of thinking slowly overtime by viewing other investors
in an irrational manner. Introspective irrationality is where investors suffer
from regret of their own decisions or they are overconfident about their own
abilities. In this sense this type of irrationality does not affect other people
and therefore it is not as pervasive.
The results have implications for the asset pricing literature as well as the
agent-based finance literature. First, we find that irrational behavior does
affect asset prices when investors aggregate irrationally but not when they
are introspective. Irrationally introspective investors are more akin to noise
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traders. Therefore, the implication is that it may be reasonable to ignore
the impact of noise traders when modeling financial markets. Second, our
result provides evidence to support the modeling of irrationally aggregating
investors in other agent-based models as opposed to noise trader investors
such as irrationally introspective investors.
2. Literature Review
Researchers in finance have explored various ways to test the limits of
market efficiency. Fama (1965, 1970) finds support to the conclusion that
the stock market is efficient in the sense that stock prices adjust very rapidly
to new information based on stock split announcements. However, the be-
havioral finance literature has grown documenting various behavioral biases
that investors exhibit.1 Some of these biases may have implications for the
broad stock market. Even so, there exists little research to date that provides
evidence that behavioral biases have a systematic impact on stock returns.2
Therefore, we explore this debate further in a new direction by using an
agent-based approach.
Recently agent-based modeling literature has grown. It is not our goal to
review the entire literature, however, some important contributions include
Chiarella (1992), Chiarella & He (2003), Chiarella, He, & Hommes (2006),
Farmer (2002), Farmer & Patelli, Kirman (1993), Lux (1995), Lux & March-
esi (2000), Westerhoff (2008), and Hommes, Huang, & Wang (2005). Overall,
these financial models model investors that pursue different strategies. In-
vestors switch among these strategies based on past performance adding a
positive feedback to the dynamics and are likely to destabilize the market.
Lux (1995) finds that above average returns are reflected in a more op-
timistic attitude that feedback into the beliefs of other investors. This type
of behavior can lead to bubbles. We continue the use of modeling feedback
effects.
Brock & Hommes (1998) explicitly model a switching mechanism where
investors choose between a fundamental (rational) and trend follower (irra-
tional) approach based on past profits. Their model differs from ours in that
the irrational investor is modeled as an integral part of the pricing process
1See http://www.behaviouralfinance.net/ for links to the various biases.
2There exist several papers such as Maymin (2009). Maymin shows how simple loss
aversion can result in extreme distributions.
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since investors are always switching between the two strategy types. There
exists no switching mechanism in our model as we compare the different
strategies that survive. Chiarella & He (2003) seek to determine how the
results of Brock & Hommes are affected by an alternative market clearing
mechanism. The focus is on a number of aspects of the modeling frame-
work. Chiarella & He also examine how agents are allowed to have diverging
attitudes to risk. We use different ways of calculating risk as a method to
distinguish between various types of investors.
Chiarella, He, & Hommes (2006) seek to introduce traders that use mov-
ing average strategies to study the financial market dynamics that result from
both fundamental and moving average strategies. We use both a moving av-
erage and exponential moving average strategies to distinguish investors in
this paper. They find that price dynamics can become less stable as investors
increase the window length.
Farmer & Joshi (2002) use a price impact function. Such a function de-
scribes the relation between the quantity of an asset bought or sold in a given
time interval and the price change caused by these orders. A similar approach
is used by Friedman & Abraham (2009) where the demand of the investors
has an impact on the resulting price change. We continue the use of this price
impact function. Westerhoff (2008) uses an agent-based model to evaluate
certain regulatory policies such as transaction taxes, central bank interven-
tions and trading halts. He finds these tools generally have the potential to
stabilize financial markets.
We use a similar idea as Westernhoff, using an already established agent-
based models to better understand financial market dynamics and alternative
policies to stabilize markets. Our question relates to better understanding
how irrational strategies impact financial market dynamics. We specifically
use the pricing process from Friedman & Abraham and the modeling of irra-
tionally introspective investors from Feldman (2011). Friedman & Abraham
develop an agent-based model where portfolio managers make choices based
on the trade-off between return and the aggregate loss of all market partic-
ipants. These investors price risk based on the concept of loss aversion as
opposed to risk aversion. They find bubbles and crashes can occur when
investors price risk based on the losses of all market participants. Feldman
(2011) creates an agent-based model where both rational and irrational in-
vestors invest in a stock market to determine which behavioral bias has the
most negative effect on performance relative to rational investors. The irra-
tional investors modeled are of the irrationally introspective type who invest
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based on the biases of recency, loss aversion, and the disposition effect. In
this paper we model three types of irrationally introspective investors and
one type of irrationally aggregating investor. Two of the irrationally in-
trospective investors are from Feldman (2011), loss averse and disposition
effected investors. We model a new third type, overconfident investors. Loss
aversion is where investors are more impacted by their losses than by their
gains. Disposition effect is where investors hold on to stocks losing money
and sell winning stocks that make them money. And overconfidence is where
investors believe their ability to invest in the stock market is better than their
actual investing skill. Therefore, they tend to invest in riskier investments.
Why do we model these biases as opposed to other biases? First, Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) won the Nobel Prize in economics for formalizing
loss aversion, where investors are more impacted by losses than by gains.
The concept of prospect theory is now widely used in the literature to ex-
plain financial and economic phenomena. In addition, the behavioral finance
literature finds evidence that individual investors are lousy investors earning
returns well below that of the standard index. Odean (1998) and Barber,
Lee, Liu, & Odean. (2007) find evidence to that the lousy returns are due to
the disposition effect. In addition, Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009) find
individual investors in Taiwan experience a performance penalty for their
trades due to overconfidence and, as a result, trade too aggressively and to
their detriment. The evidence suggests that loss aversion, overconfidence,
and disposition affect are some of the stronger biases. Lastly, we use a vari-
ant of the Friedman & Abraham model to model irrationally aggregating
investors. These investors are impacted not only by their own losses but by
the losses of all other participants in the market. Therefore, they aggregate
information irrationally.
We use an agent-based framework in order to integrate the various types
of biases investors into one market to analyze the price dynamics. Prior to
agent-based models there have been authors such as De Long et al. (1990,
1991), that have argued to why imperfectly rational traders may survive in
the long run. De Long et al. (1991) examine traders who are overconfident
and therefore hold more of the risky asset thereby earning a higher return. As
a result noise traders can earn higher expected profits than rational traders.
Hirshleifer & Luo (2001) model overconfidence as overestimation of the pre-
cision of private information signals and they model prices endogenously.
They find that overconfident traders do better than purely rational traders
at exploiting misvaluation caused by liquidity or noise trading. We use these
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results on overconfident investors to create a biased overconfident investor in
our simulation.
We use a lot of the same agent-based tools such as modeling price impact
and feedback effects. However, the model differs in that there exists no
switching in order to evaluate whether irrational investors can survive in a
marketplace along rational investors.
3. Model Framework
We use the pricing framework from Friedman & Abraham to create a
marketplace that includes both rational and irrational investors. Each type
of investor buys and sells a single safe asset with constant return R0 and a
single risky asset with variable return R1. The safe asset can be considered
cash and the risky asset as the S&P 500. Each investor chooses a single
ordered variable u ∈ [0,∞) that represents the allocation to the risky asset.
For example, if u=0.75, the investor has 75% of their funds invested in the
risky asset and 25% invested in cash. If u = 1 the investor is fully invested in
the stock portfolio and if u > 1 the investor is borrowing cash to invest in the
stock portfolio. The investor’s net portfolio value is denoted by the variable
zi. The net portfolio value, zi, grows or declines based on the manager’s net
return. The price of the risky asset results in the following process,
Pt = V u¯
δ
t . (1)
where V is fundamental value, u¯t is the z-weighted mean allocation across
all investors, and δ is a parameter that captures the sensitivity of price to
buying pressure. Therefore, investors who earn a greater portfolio value, zi,
have a greater influence on the price. The fundamental value V is the present
value of the per share earnings. It is calculated as V (0) =
∫∞
0
1egste−Rstdt =
(Rs − gs)−1 where earnings growth is gs and future earnings are discounted
at some rate Rs > gs.
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Asset supply comes from fundamental-oriented market participants such
as issuers of stocks and bonds, and perhaps other individual investors. In-
vestors exert buying pressure whose intensity is parameterized by δ. Even
3The theoretical model is continuous. However, we create a discrete model when pro-
gramming as investors rebalance every week.
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though supply does not change, one can simulate different environments
where a low δ is consistent with a large supply and thus weaker buying
pressure or a high δ is consistent with small supply.
The return on the risky asset, R1,t, is determined from breaking down the
price function into the dividend yield and the capital gains rate. Hence the
realized yield on the risky asset is
R1,t = (Rs − g)u¯−δt + g + δ ˙¯u/u¯t, (2)
where the first term is the dividend yield, the second term captures capital
gains due to economic growth, and the third term reflects capital gains due
to financial market activity. Note that R1 is equal to the discount rate Rs as
in the CAPM when u¯t = 1 and ˙¯u = 0.
The discount rate is Rs = Ro + dR where the term dR ≥ 0 represents all
other factors. These factors include g, since economic growth is known and
economy-wide.
The base payoff function is,
φ(ui,t) = ui,t(R1,t −R0 + αi,t)− 1
2
Aσ2u2i,t. (3)
The base payoff function is based on the traditional mean variance frame-
work where each investor chooses an allocation to the risky asset, ui, based
on the trade off between the excess return, R1,t − R0, and risk, Aσ2. How-
ever, there are three important differences. First, every investor differs by
receiving an idiosyncratic shock, αi. The αi is a luck component. Some
investors outperform the market one week via a positive shock and others
underperform the market via a negative shock. For non-overconfident in-
vestors it is calculated using the most recent known value, αi(t − 1) and a
random variable,
αi(t) = e
−ταi(t− 1) +
√
1− e−2τ
2τ
σν, (4)
for some given volatility parameter σ > 0, decay parameter τ > 0, and an
independent realization ν from the unit normal distribution. (Feller, 1971, p
336).
The idiosyncratic shock follows a mean reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro-
cess. If αi is positive (negative) for investor i, she outperforms (under per-
forms) the market, R1. The intuition is that every investor holds a diversified
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portfolio that mimics the S&P 500 but may differ in the collection of stocks
one investor holds. At any point in time one investor may hold a stock that
returns a high positive (negative) return that creates a positive (negative) al-
pha compared to the benchmark S&P 500. This under and out performance
is quantified by their α which nets out to zero in the long-run. Second, the re-
turn, R1 is endogenously determined by the market participants as expressed
in equation 2. Third, A is a constant risk aversion parameter as in the mean
variance framework when investors are rational. However, A is endogenously
determined by behavioral biases when investors act irrationally. We create
irrational investors by turning A on. The manner in how A is modeled is
dependent on the kind of behavioral bias the investor exhibits.
Investors adjust their allocation overtime by moving toward the optimal
allocation to minimize trading frictions. Large investors and portfolio man-
agers typically sell off or buy in increments over time. Friedman & Abraham
call this following a gradient.
φui,t = R1,t −R0 + αi,t − Aσ2ui,t. (5)
3.1. Rational Investors
We use the term rational in the sense of finance and not economics.
The rational investor sticks to the traditional approach of the mean vari-
ance framework,
φ(ui,t) = ui,t(R1,t −R0 + αi,t)− 1
2
Aσ2u2i,t, (6)
where R0 and A are constant parameters and αi,t is an idiosyncratic shock.
The rational investor uses a static long-term variance based on the historical
variance of the S&P 500, 4%. They re-balance every week as prices change
to maintain their desired exposure given the long-run variance. The rational
investors move toward their optimal amount of risky asset allocation as in
equation five.
3.2. Irrationally Aggregating Investors
We model two sets of irrational investors. The first set of irrational in-
vestors are investors who aggregate irrationally.4 They are irrational in that
4Irrationally aggregating investors are modeled similar to the portfolio managers in
Friedman & Abraham.
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they are very sensitive to their own losses as well as the losses of others around
them. When they see others losing money their perception of risk increases
even if there is no fundamental reason to change their risk perception. In
addition, they put too much weight on current losses relative to past losses
in assessing risk, a behavioral bias called recency. The base payoff function
developed for the aggregating irrational investor is the following,
φ(ui,t) = ui,t(R1,t −R0 + αi,t)− 1
2
Atσ
2u2i,t. (7)
The payoff function is similar to the rational investor except that A has
become At. The risk in this model, Atσ
2, is defined as the perceived loss
index, At, times the historical variance, σ
2. The perceived loss index can
be thought of as a risk aversion parameter, however, it is endogenously de-
termined and time varying. It is determined by using a loss function and
exponential averaging. The loss function is defined as negative gross return,
Li,t = max{0,−RGi,t}, where RGi,t = (R1,t − R0 + αi,t)ui,t + R0 is the gross
return that investor i currently earns on her portfolio at time t.
We then an exponential average of each investor’s loss function. Investors
seem to judge investments by the overall historical track record, with greater
emphasis on more recent results. The natural formalization is an exponential
average. The exponential average is updated from the previous exponential
average loss Lˆi(t− 1) as follows:
Lˆi(t) = e
−ηLˆi(t− 1) + (1− e−η)Li(t). (8)
The perceived loss index, At, is proportional to market-wide losses,
At = βLˆT (t), (9)
the parameter β > 0 reflects investors’ sensitivity to perceived loss, and LˆT (t)
is the perceived loss Lˆi(t) averaged across investors i weighted by portfolio
size zi at time t.
5 Aggregating irrational investors aggregate the losses of
all investors weighting the most current losses more than past losses. In
this respect large losses from one or two investors can increase perceived risk
among all other investors.
5Parameters such as β are explained in the Appendix.
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3.3. Introspective Irrational Investors
The second set of irrational investors are emotional about their own per-
formance in three different ways: they are overconfident, loss averse, and
disposition effected. Modeling several different types of biases allows for the
possibility of self canceling trades as explained in the introduction.
3.3.1. Overconfident Investors
We formalize overconfident investors via αi,t. We assume that overcon-
fident investors overestimate their ability to outperform the overall market.
More specifically, overconfident investors tend to remember positive perfor-
mance shocks more than the negative performance shocks where as all other
investors treat the positive performance and negative performance shocks
equally. We formalize this by using a smaller τ (greater memory) parameter
for positive shocks and a larger τ for negative shocks, (less memory). We
define αˆi,t as the alpha for an overconfident investor. Overconfident investors
continuously believe they are outperforming the market and therefore add
more leverage to their portfolio. During down markets they may get margin
calls because of the overuse of leverage. Their payoff function then becomes
φ(ui,t) = ui,t(R1,t −R0 + αˆi,t)− 1
2
Aσ2u2i,t. (10)
and their payoff gradient becomes
φui,t = R1,t −R0 + αˆi,t − Aσ2ui,t. (11)
3.3.2. Loss Averse Investors
Loss averse investors are very skittish when it comes to losing money.
If they experience heavy personal losses their perception of risk increases
dramatically. The loss averse investors price risk using a moving average of
past losses called loss aversion risk. The moving average of losses or loss
aversion risk, Lˆi,t is determined in two steps. First, it is determined by
picking up the investor’s current losses, Li,t = max{0,−RGi,t}, where RGi,t
is the gross return at time t. Next, the losses over time are averaged using
a moving average where n equals the number of periods used to calculate
the moving average. In the base case n is equal to two years. We use
two years because research suggests investors weight the most recent year
and then the decay ends after another year.6 This step is distinct from an
6See Feldman (2010).
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exponential averaging in that current and past losses are weighted equally.
When calculating successive values, a new value comes into the sum and an
old value drops out,
Lˆi,t = β(Lˆt−1 − Li,t−n
n
+
Li,t
n
). (12)
The payoff function for the loss averse investor becomes
φ(ui,t) = ui,t(R1,t −R0 + αi,t)− 1
2
Lˆi,tσ
2u2i,t. (13)
and the payoff gradient becomes,
φui,t = R1,t −R0 + αi,t − Lˆi,tσ2ui,t. (14)
3.3.3. Disposition effected investors
The disposition effected investors tend to buy or hold when incurring
losses and sell when the market increases. They hold on to losses for too long
because they feel regret of choosing a losing stock and want to recover their
losses. On the flip side they tend to sell too early. To formalize this process
we calculate disposition risk. To calculate disposition risk we first pick up the
gains, Di,t = max{0, RGi,t}. Second a moving average is calculated where the
last value moves out and the most current value moves into the calculation
of the moving average,
Dˆi,t = β(Dˆt−1 − Di,t−n
n
+
Di,t
n
). (15)
When disposition effected investors experience gains, Di,t is high, and
therefore they tend to sell too fast. If they experience losses, disposition
risk is low and they tend to hold or buy more shares because of regret. The
formalization of this process means that these investors cost average down.
For example, as the price of the risky asset falls, investors buy more of the
risky asset reducing their cost basis. Similar to the loss averse investors,
disposition effected investors average their Di,t for several years weighting
observations equally.
The payoff function for the disposition effected investor becomes
φ(ui,t) = ui,t(R1,t −R0 + αi,t)− 1
2
Dˆi,tσ
2u2i,t. (16)
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and the payoff gradient is,
φui,t = R1,t −R0 + αi,t − Dˆi,tσ2ui,t. (17)
3.4. Solvency
The portfolio wealth of the typical investor is zi,t. The portfolio size
increases or decreases based on the gross return of the investor. The portfolio
size can become negative when investors borrow at the risk free rate to invest
in the risky asset and the asset price plunges. If the gross return decreases
such that the portfolio wealth becomes negative the simulation program kicks
that investor out of the market and the total investor population declines by
one.
4. Simulations
We run the simulation using an agent-based program called NetLogo.
The interface can be seen in Figure 1. The simulation consists of investors
whose allocation ui (horizontal coordinate) and portfolio size zi (vertical
coordinate). The simulation is at weekly frequency (Freq = 52). The sliders
in the interface, center, width, altitude, and height determine the initial u and
z for each investor. The ”altitude” sets the middle of the initial z distribution,
and ”width” and ”height” control the bounds on the rectangle. At the start
of the simulation each investor randomly starts off with a different u and
z based on an uniform distribution. The initial population of managers is
uniformly distributed in the (u, z) rectangle [0.2, 1.4]× [0.4, 1.6], set via the
sliders labeled ”population”. The initial conditions change at the beginning
of every new simulation run. Each simulation lasts one hundred years or
5,200 weeks. We delete the first twenty years to insure that initial conditions
do not impact the results. We run ten simulations for each regime using the
baseline parameter configuration explained in the Appendix.
We run various regimes where the total population in each regime remains
at thirty, however, the composition of the population per regime changes.
Friedman & Abraham find thirty investors is the suitable number of investors
to achieve realistic stock price dynamics.
1. Regime 1: Rational: Thirty rational investors.
2. Regime 2A: Irrationally Aggregating: Thirty irrational investors that
aggregate losses irrationally.
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3. Regime 2B: Irrationally Introspective: Thirty irrationally introspective
investors. Ten loss averse investors, ten overconfident investors, and
ten disposition effected investors.
4. Regime 3A: Combined 3A: Fifteen rational investors and fifteen irra-
tionally aggregating investors.
5. Regime 3B: Combined 3B: Fifteen rational investors, five loss averse,
five overconfident, and five disposition effected investors.
The parameters are configured based on long-run averages of the S&P
500. For example, the long-run standard deviation of the S&P 500 is 20%
based on total returns of the S&P 500 for the period from 1926 through 2014.
This number is used in the calculation of αi.
7 The long-term real US GDP
growth rate is approximately 2%. We also define a recession or financial crisis
as a 30% fall from the peak in the last six months.
Lastly, we use a baseline parameter configuration used in Friedman &
Abraham. The baseline configuration is presented in Table 1 in the Ap-
pendix. However, we create eight different parameter configurations for ro-
bustness testing. The eight different configurations are created by changing
one of the parameters to an admissibly high level and then to an admissibly
low level while keeping all other parameters constant. For example, one con-
figuration is where we change δ from the baseline of two to four. The other
configuration is where we change δ from two to one.
Table 2 summarizes the number and different types of simulations. For
each regime we run ten simulations using a baseline configuration. Each
simulation last 5,200 weeks or one hundred years. However, we delete the first
4,160 weeks in order to test the long-run implications of irrational behavior.
Therefore, there exists 1,040*10, or 10,400 observations per regime. We
calculate the relevant statistics for each simulation within each regime first
before aggregating by regime as opposed to pooling the simulation data and
then running statistics.
5. Results
Table 3 displays the return properties between the purely rational and
purely irrational regimes. Results suggest, as expected, the rational regime
exhibits low volatility, standard deviation equals six percent, and returns
7Source from http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ adamodar/pc/datasets/histretSP.xls.
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are characterized by no fat tails. However, the returns do exhibit slight
negative skewness. Both the irrational regimes exhibit high volatility, over
25% standard deviation, large negative skewness, and fat tails. The following
sections draw a pairwise comparison of the results across the various regimes.
5.1. Rational and Irrationally Aggregating
We first a look at the null hypothesis that the return properties from the
combination of the irrationally aggregating and rational investors simula-
tions, Combined 3A, converge to that of the rational regime in the long-run.
Using the Mann-Whitney test, in Table 4, we can reject the null hypothesis
that the mean return is the same across the two regimes at the one per-
cent significance level. In addition, the Combined 3A regime’s mean price is
$23.33 which is below the mean price of the rational regime of $28.32. More-
over, the maximum and minimum Combined 3A regime return is similar to
that of a large financial crisis experienced in developed markets. The min-
imum and maximum annual return for the Combined 3A regime are -65%
and 50%, respectively, where as the range for the rational regime is between -
34% and 15%. Results from Table 5 indicate other distributional features are
different as well. The rational regime return distribution is slightly skewed
with no fat tails, whereas regime 3A’s return distribution is not normal, being
characterized by negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis.
Results from Table 6 displays the results of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The test indicates there exists a significant difference (p-value = 0.0001) in
return distributions between the rational regime and Combined 3A.
Lastly, the crash dynamics shown in Table 7 also confirm a significant
difference between the two regimes. The average number of 30% crises in a
twenty year period for the Combined 3A regime is 1.08 which equates to one
crisis every eighteen years. The maximum number of crises recorded in one
simulation is four. This is compared to the rational regime which averages
0.20 crises per twenty years or one crisis every century. Formally, a t-test
rejects the null hypothesis that the average number of crises is the same
between the two regimes at the 1 percent significance level.
5.2. Rational and Irrationally Introspective
We now turn to the irrationally introspective investors. We find there
is no significant difference between the rational and combined rational and
irrationally introspective regime Combined 3B. The mean, maximum, and
minimum return found in Table 4 are very close between the Combined 3B
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and rational regime. The only difference between the two regimes is that
the Combined 3B regime’s mean price is significantly lower than the rational
regime’s mean price even though the return properties are similar. The irra-
tional investors have the effect of lowering the price below the fundamental
value. Barber and Odean (2006) find that individual investors consistently
under perform market benchmarks. Our results suggest the macro impact
of individual investors could be that they lower the market price below its
fundamental value.
Results from Table 5 indicate that both the rational and Combined 3B
regime’s return properties follow a close approximation to a normal distri-
bution. Formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in Table 6, however, reveal that
both regimes exhibit non-normal distributions because of the negative skew-
ness. Results suggest that these differences are relatively small in economic
terms, though formal tests reveal that the return distributions are statisti-
cally different between the two regimes.
Moreover, the crisis statistics in Table 7 suggest there is no significant
difference between the two regimes. On average there occurs around one
crisis per century in the Combined 3B and rational regime.
5.3. Differences Among Irrational Investors
We also ask whether different types of irrational investors have differ-
ent effects on asset prices. Results from Table 8 indicate that irrationally
aggregating investors alongside rational investors have a greater impact on
volatility and fat tails than the irrationally introspective investors alongside
rational investors. The irrationally introspective investors impact is that they
lower the mean price significantly below fundamental value. The fundamen-
tal value in the baseline parameter configuration is $25 per share. The mean
price for the rational regime is $28.32. The mean price in the combined
rational-irrationally introspective, Combined 3B, regime is $19.84, twenty
percent below fundamental value.
Figure 1 displays a histogram of the market’s yearly returns for the ra-
tional regime, Combined 3A, and Combined 3B. It can be seen that the
rational regime and Combined 3B are comparable, annual returns approxi-
mate a normal distribution. However, Combined 3A’s return distribution is
significantly skewed exhibiting large fat tails.
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5.4. Performance
Table 9 displays return statistics for the three types of investors rational,
irrationally aggregating, and irrationally introspective.8 The performance
results highlight some of the conclusions we have written about so far. Results
indicate the aggregating investor outperforms all other investors on a absolute
basis. However, the rational investor outperforms all other investors on a risk
adjusted basis.
5.5. Robustness Testing
We explore the long-term properties in the previous section by deleting
the first 80% of observations per simulation. The 80% number is an arbitrary
deletion point. Therefore, we explore annual return properties by deleting
40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, and 80% of the first observations per simulation. Table
10 indicates that the return properties are relatively stable across the various
arbitrary deletion points. We find that the irrationally introspective investors
do not have a strong impact on the macro price throughout the simulation.
However, we know from regime 2B that without rational investors the irra-
tionally introspective investors create excessive volatility, negative skewness,
and fat tails. Therefore, as EMH theorists argue, irrationally introspective
investors do not impact stock returns when combined with rational investors.
Table 11 displays the volatility results for simulations using eight other
parameter configurations. In these eight parameter configurations we only
change one parameter at a time to a very high level and then a very low
level. The purpose of this type of parameter configuration is to test whether
the results hold under more extreme parameter configurations. If so, the
robustness test would be passed.
The volatility in the Combined 3A regime is significantly higher than the
other two regimes under all parameter configurations except for when tau
is equal to three. The volatility in the Combined 3B regime is closer to the
rational regime but modestly higher suggesting the introspective irrational
investors play a role at times in asset price formation when investors are
sensitive.
8We find that every type of introspective investor returns are below the rational and
aggregating investor.
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6. Conclusion
At one extreme, even if some investors are irrational, aggregate market
forces can result in substantial market rationality when irrational investors
do not aggregate but act as noise traders. At the other extreme, irrational
investors may get richer, not poorer during stock market bubbles when they
aggregate information about others irrationally. We find that the type of
irrationality is an important factor in understanding how psychology impacts
asset prices in the long-run. If the type of irrationality is introspective we
find evidence to prove the EMH argument correct. Irrational traders tend
to go bankrupt and trades cancel each other out, so that they only have a
minor impact on market outcomes as EMH suggests. However, we find that
when investors aggregate information in an irrational manner they can have
a strong impact on the broad market.
Our results suggest the following for future modeling of financial markets.
First, noise traders or what we call irrationally introspective investors have
little impact on asset prices in the medium and long-run. Therefore, they
could be safely ignored for future work to understand long-run price dynam-
ics. Secondly, EMH theory may for long periods of time, however, there
can occur periods where investors aggregate information irrationally. This
process of aggregating information irrationally is a slow drawn out process
leading to periods where EMH theory does not hold. Based on these results
we argue that behavioral finance and EMH are compatible and not competi-
tive or one is right and the other is wrong. In the simulations the irrationally
aggregating investor can appear to look rational. We know which investor is
which, however, if one did not know it would be hard to distinguish between
the two. However, at other times it can be easy to distinguish. We believe
the appropriate modeling is to model market efficiency where biases can in-
terfere in the marketplace from time to time. In other words where biases
are turned off and then turned on again. And those biases must be of the
irrationally aggregating type.
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8. Appendix
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Baseline Definition Meaning Theory
Ro 3% risk-free rate ↑ ⇒ more to risk-free asset
dR 6% discount-rate ↑ ⇒ more to risk-free asset
g 2% growth-rate economic growth ↑ ⇒ more to risky asset asset
σ 20% standard deviation variability of idiosyncratic shock ↑ ⇒ more crises
τ 0.70 persistence of idiosyncratic shock shock persistence ↑ ⇒ less crises
η 0.70 memory rate current losses versus past losses ↑ ⇒ more crises
β 2 sensitivity to risk how sensitive investors are to risk ↑ ⇒ more crises
δ 2 elasticity sensitivity of demand change to price ↑ ⇒ more crises
Note. The parameters are chosen based on long-term calculations from 1926 to 2014. The 3% average
for Tbill was calculated based on returns for the period from 1926 through 2014 using T-bills represented
by the Barclays 3-Month Treasury Bellwether index. Based on the World Bank data the average real
GDP growth rate from 1969-2014 was 2.7%. If we lengthen the time frame to 1926 we estimate a growth
rate of 2%. The discount rate can be thought of as the US stock market risk premium. The average risk
premium from 1926 to 2014 was around 6%. See
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ adamodar/pc/datasets/histretSP.xls
21
9. Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Netlogo Interface
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Table 2: Summary Stats
Regime # of Sims # of Rational # of Irrational Nobs per Sim
1. Rational 20 30 0 1,040
2A. Aggregating Irrational 20 0 30 1,040
2B. Introspective Irrational 20 0 30 1,040
3A. Rational & Aggregating 20 15 15 1,040
3B. Rational & Introspective 20 15 15 1,040
Note.Each simulation lasts one century or 5,200 weeks. We delete the first 80 years or 4,160 observations.
Table 3: Return Properties: Irrationally Introspective vs. Irrationally Aggregating
Regime Mean Return Max Return Min Return Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Rational 7.76% 15.53% -34.66 6.56% -1.10 2.56
Aggregating 12.11% 58.79% -93.87% 28.42% -4.82 33.80
Introspective 10.52% 40.95% -98.34% 25.03% -3.80 21.76
Note. Returns are annualized. Nobs per simulation = 1,040. Nobs per regime = 10*1,040=10,400.
Combined 3A is the regime where irrationally aggregating and rational investors market up the market.
Combined 3B is the regime where irrationally introspective and rational investors market up the market.
Table 4: Price Properties
Regime Mean Price Max Price Min Price Mean Return Max Return Min Return
Rational 28.32 41.46 20.42 7.76% 15.53% -34.66%
Combined 3A 23.33∗∗ 42.68 5.90 7.96%∗∗ 50.11% -65.81%
Combined 3B 19.84∗∗ 34.08 12.11 7.40% 20.45% -30.85%
Note. Returns are annualized. Combined 3A is the regime where irrationally aggregating and rational
investors market up the market. Combined 3B is the regime where irrationally introspective and rational
investors market up the market. Nobs per simulation = 1,040. Nobs per regime = 10*1,040=10,400.
Mann Whitney test is used to test difference in means between the two regimes. Z=65.35 for difference
in mean price and Z=-17.65 for difference in mean return between Rational and Combined 3A regime.
Z=109 for difference in mean price and Z=-0.298 for difference in mean return between Rational and
Combined 3B regime. Null hypothesis is that combined 3A and combined 3B regime is not statistically
different from the Rational regime.∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Distribution Stats
Regime Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Rational 6.58% -1.10 2.57
Combined 3A 18.45% -2.55 12.73
Combined 3B 7.91% -0.52 0.29
Note. Nobs per simulation = 1,040. Nobs per regime = 10*1,040=10,400. Combined 3A is the regime
where irrationally aggregating and rational investors make up the market. Combined 3B is the regime
where irrationally introspective and rational investors market up the market.
Table 6: Difference in Distribution
Test D P value
Combined 3A K-S 0.17 0.0001
Combined 3B K-S 0.07 0.0001
Note. K-S refers to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. D refers to the magnitude of the difference in
distribution. Nobs per simulation = 1,040. Nobs per regime = 10*1,040=10,400.
Table 7: Crisis Stats
Regime Avg. # of Crises per 20 Years Avg. Crisis Time Max # of Crises
Rational 0.19 9 1
Combined 3A 1.08∗∗ 41 4
Combined 3B 0.10 11 1
Note. A crisis is defined as a a 30% drop from the most recent high in the last six months. Crisis time is
measured in weeks. Combined 3A is the regime where irrationally aggregating and rational investors
market up the market. Combined 3B is the regime where irrationally introspective and rational investors
market up the market. Nobs per simulation = 1,040. Nobs per regime = 10*1,040=10,400. T test is
used to test statistical differences. Null hypothesis is that combined 3A regime and combined 3B regime
is not statistically different from regime 1. ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
Table 8: Return Properties: Aggregating Irrational vs. Introspective Irrational
Regime Mean Return Max Return Min Return Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Combined 3A 7.94% 51.11% -65.81% 18.45% -2.60 12.76
Combined 3B 7.35% 21.05% -31.48% 7.85% -0.52 0.30
Note. The return is an annual return. Nobs per simulation = 1,040. Nobs per regime =
10*1,040=10,400. T stats are used to test statistical differences. Null hypothesis is that regime 2 and 3
are not statistically different from regime 1. ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
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Figure 2: Differences in Distribution
Table 9: Performance Comparison
Group Average St.Dev Sharpe
1. Rational 5.15% 4.90% 0.083
2. Aggregating 6.10% 6.80% -0.233
3. Introspective 1.45% 6.02% -1.52
Note- Return statistics per group. All statistics are annualized over a one hundred year simulation
period. The mean, standard deviation, and Sharpe are computed by averaging over the simulation runs
per regime and then across the regimes. We assume the risk free rate is 3% in computing the Sharpe
ratio.
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Table 10: Robustness Test: Deletion Points
Regime 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Standard Deviation
Rational 0.069 0.068 0.067 0.064 0.065
Combined 3A 0.179 0.182 0.165 0.175 0.185
Combined 3B 0.079 0.080 0.081 0.081 0.079
Skewness
Rational -0.77 -0.76 -0.91 -0.94 -0.77
Combined 3A -3.21 -3.31 -2.36 -2.45 -2.59
Combined 3B -0.50 -0.47 -0.44 -0.44 -0.51
Kurtosis
Rational 1.772 1.776 2.412 2.338 2.672
Combined 3A 21.031 22.383 12.524 12.276 12.73
Combined 3B 0.503 0.236 0.193 0.112 0.29
Note- The percentages are the percent of observations deleted in each simulation. Each
simulation lasts 100 years. Therefore, 40% means that the first 40 years of observations
were deleted. Fifty percent means the first 50 years of data were deleted.
Table 11: Robustness Test: Difference in Standard Deviation
Parameter Number Rational Combined 3A Combined 3B
tau 0.1 18.18% 28.45% 26.31%
3 2.86% 4.79% 4.96%
eta 0.1 6.70% 14.87% 8.34%
3 6.22% 15.78% 6.23%
beta 1 6.83% 11.90% 9.24%
5 7.14% 42.15% 8.92%
delta 1 3.01% 4.84% 3.93%
3 12.40% 48.58% 23.65%
Note- Tau signifies how long the stochastic shock lasts for in the alpha calculation. Larger tau means
less persistence. Eta signifies memory of losses. Larger eta means less memory. Beta signifies sensitivity
to losses. The larger the beta the larger the sensitivity. Delta signifies the sensitivity to changes in
investor demand on the stock price.
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